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ABSTRACT
Title of Research Paper:

Formal Safety Assessment on Inland Self-unload
Carriers in the Pearl River Delta

Degree:

MSc

The research paper is a study on the application of FSA methodology to inland selfunload carriers in the Pearl River Delta (PRD).

Both quantity and tonnage of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD have increased in
the last decade.

It is significant to analyze the risk of inland self-unload carrier since

it has become a typical ship type in the PRD. FSA has been proved to be a structured,
systematic and useful methodology in evaluating and reducing risks in marine industry.
The risk of research object is analyzed under the framework of FSA.

Hazards of inland self-unload carriers are identified, ranked and analyzed via data
analysis, risk matrix, event tree analysis (ETA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). After
verifying risks’ being in As Low As Reasonable Practical (ALARP) area, several risk
control options (RCOs) are put forward. Cost-effectiveness analysis (ECA) of one
of the RCOs is conducted and NCAF of the RCO is calculated.
based on the Acceptable NCAF (NCAFA).

Suggestions are given

Direction of further research is

recommended.

KEY WORDS: FSA, Inland Self-unload Carrier, Pearl River Delta, ALARP, NCAF.
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1.1

INTRODUCTION

Research Background

The fast development of real estate industry in China generates heavy demand of river
sand. The demand is even bigger in the PRD since it is one of the three biggest
economical circles in China. Inland self-unload carriers are designed to transport
sand, broken stones and other bulk building materials. There are more and more
inland self-unload carriers operated in the PRD for their high efficiency of unloading
without reliance on unloading device from port terminals. It is a relatively new type
of bulk carrier, so the regulation is not as mature as other normal cargo ships in the
PRD, resulting in higher frequency of accidents. According to statistics, there are 408
accidents which happened in the PRD from 2006 to 2015. Accidents involving inland
self-unload carriers account for about one fourth of all accidents while the rate of
inland self-unload carriers to all ships operated in the PRD is far less than one fourth
from the perspective of both quantity and tonnage. In certain scenarios like ships’
colliding small boats, the risk of inland self-unload carriers is even higher than other
ships.

Surveyors, FSC (Flag State Control) officers, investigators gave many

suggestions on how to improve safety level, but none of them did systematic and
structed analysis to the overall risk.
FSA is a systematic and structured methodology adopted by International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in evaluating regulations on maritime safety and marine
environmental protection via risk analysis and cost-benefit assessment (IMO, 2013).
In recent decades, there are so many successful applications of FSA in marine industry
and other industries, proving the availability of FSA in evaluating risk and making
regulations. The application of FSA to inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is
significant in understanding the overall risk and instructive for decision-making.
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1.2

Literature Review

Relevant literatures were widely reviewed beforehand. Pu illustrated the widely
existed overload and free liquid surface after loading, leading to decreased stability
(Pu & Xia, 2002).

Accumulated water in the cargo hold area is unavoidable because

of the loading method of self-unload carriers. The process of loading is not operated
in a wharf but in the waterway. Sand dredges transfer wetted sand to self-unload
carriers directly. The content of water varies from 10% to 20% and water needs time
to exude from sand. Even seafarers pump out water in and after the process of loading,
still there will be some accumulated water exuding from wetted sand.

Pu

recommended a method to calculate the effect of free liquid surface on stability.
Though the risk control measure on free liquid surface has been adopted in 2004,
hazards due to the loading method are not just free liquid surface.

Some seafarers

are accustomed to sailing before water is pumped out completely enough, resulting in
overloaded voyage, which is far more risky than free liquid surface according to the
casualty statistics. Still the method of supervising overload is selective check which
is inefficient.

This paper brings forward a more intelligent option to supervise

overload of inland self-unload carriers in the following text.
Chen figured out the poor quality of inland seafarers and the loose management of
inland shipping company in the PRD, coming up with some administrative suggestions
(Chen & Wang, 2008). Unlike ocean-going seafarers, the highest diploma of most of
Chinese inland seafarers including captains and chief engineers is lower than senior
middle school.

In China, individualized ship operation without establishing a

company is illegal. However, there are so many individual shipowners owning only
one ship which the shipowner also works on. It is uneconomical for each of them to
establish a company, so they join a company and pay a little money.
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Many inland

shipping companies just have notional ownership of these ships for the convenience
of individual shipowners’ joining companies, without actual control of ships.
Hu pointed out the poor radar operational skill of inland seafarers in China and advised
the administration to enhance training of how to use radar (Hu, 2008).

English

instruction of imported radar is an obstacle for inland seafarers’ understanding of some
functions.

Cao recommended the introduction of ARPA to inland ships (Cao, 2001).

Wang recommended a telescopic conveyor belt to reduce the extension of conveyor
belt, improving maneuverability and visual range, (Wang & Zheng & Chen, 2013).
Inland self-unload carriers have a conveyor belt extended out of the bow for unloading
of cargo. The extension increases the maximum length of the carrier, weakening
maneuverability like turning and visual range. Telescopic conveyor which has been
widely used on new inland self-unload carriers after 2015, can take the conveyor belt
back to a certain extent after unloading.
Kuang identified three common hazards which influence stability of inland self-unload
carrier: free liquid surface, overload and improper loading (Kuang & Huang & Xie,
2010).

Improper loading including unbalanced loading and over-high loading,

decreases both stability and visual range. Many inland seafarers do not pay enough
attention to the harm of improper loading. Unbalanced loading contributes to initial
heel or excessive trim.

Over-high loading raises the gravity center of cargo, leading

to poor stability as well as excessive blind area.
Li advised designers to consider changing the shape of transverse section from V-shape
to W-shape, lowering the gravity center of cargo, increasing the capacity of cargo hold
(Li, 2011).

Li made both qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis on the

advantages of W-shape cargo hold.
Zhou demonstrated the sensitivity of stability to the amount of overload through a case
study (Zhou, 2011). The stability of the chosen self-unload carrier decreased sharply
as the draft went beyond the load line due to the V-shape cargo hold.
3

However, all these researchers just focused on certain problems of inland self-unload
carriers rather than the overall risk. So there is a gap in researching the overall risk
of inland self-unload carriers and the cost-effectiveness of risk control measures. A
comprehensive analysis on the risk of inland self-unload carriers under the framework
of FSA is meaningful in filling the gap.
1.3

Scope

This study limits to inland self-unload carriers of and above 300 GT in the PRD.
Nearly 90% researches including all studies in literature review are about inland selfunload carriers in the PRD since inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is more
common than other areas. Besides, it is more easy for the author to collect data since
the author works in Guangdong MSA governing the PRD.
Most of inland self-unload carriers below 300 GT in the PRD are very old ships about
to be scrapped. Considering that such small inland self-unload carriers have gradually
lost their market under the tendency of large dimension, considering that most of them
stopped operation in the last ten years, inland self-unload carriers below 300 GT are
excluded from the research scope.
1.4

Data sources

The lack of national database of marine industry increases the difficulty of applying
FSA to domestic ships in China. Data about historical casualties is arranged from
accidents reports one by one by the author. Though the author collects and arranges
investigation reports as complete as possible in these three months, still there may be
omission for lack of database in China. Cost-effectiveness of a RCO tends to be
conservative in this study since adding omitted accidents into the calculation just
makes it more cost-effective.
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1.5

Assumptions

This study assumes that risk acquired from historical accidents data is equal to the risk
at the present stage. The modification of historical data is omitted in this study. All
hazards occurred in the past are assumed to be the whole risk of research object.
Number of inland self-unload carriers registered in Guangdong Province is easier to
get than all inland self-unload carriers operated in the PRD. Actually, nearly all
inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 GT registered in Guangdong Province
are operated in the PRD. As to inland self-unload carriers from 300 to 1000 GT, some
of them may be operated in the east of Guangdong. Anyway, this study assumes that
all of them sail in the PRD to get a higher NCAF in CEA. Correspondingly, the author
excludes accidents of self-unload carriers registered outside Guangdong Province in
statistics.
1.6

Announcement

The author identified one hazard – self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats and put
forwarded one RCO for inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 gross tonnage
(GT) in an unpublished assignment (Author, 2018). RCO 1 in this paper is just the
same idea except that this research paper makes the scenario affected by the RCO more
reasonable. The threshold of small boats is 30 GT in this study while it is 120 GT in
the assignment. Two accidents involving multiple accidents are excluded because of
the modification of the scenario. Besides, several newly collected accidents are added
into analysis.
The cost of the RCO is higher in this study for using a more expensive product with
larger visual range in CEA. The average risk reduction estimated by experts is less
than the value assumed in the assignment. So NCAF of the RCO is higher than the
value in the assignment.
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The value of acceptable NCAF in this study is also more reasonable after
comprehensive consideration of vacation, education and retirement in China.
1.7

Structure of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of six chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces the research

background, scope, assumptions and significance of this research. Chapter 2 presents
the development, framework and techniques of FSA and choice of techniques in this
research paper. Chapter 3 discloses information about the network of waterway in the
PRD, characteristics of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD, recently introduced risk
control measures and the calculation of acceptable NCAF in China. Chapter 4 is
data analysis of historical accidents.

Chapter 5 applies FSA to research object.

Finally, Chapter 6 obtains summaries and conclusions.
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2.

METHODOLOGY OF FSA

This chapter demonstrates the development, framework and techniques of FSA.

Five

steps of FSA are presented. Brief principles on choosing models are illustrated.
2.1

Development of FSA

Methodology similar to FSA has been applied in the industry of off-shore platform for
a longer time. As long ago as 1970s, UK and Norway started to develop Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) for off-shore industry in the North Sea (Brandsæter, 2002).
In 1988, 167 fatalities died in the casualty of Piper Alpha and then experts introduced
various models for risk analysis from other industries, summarizing a regulation about
safety assessment which is very similar to FSA methodology.
the concept of FSA in a proposal submitted by UK.

In 1993, IMO accepted

In 1997, IMO enacted Interim

Guidelines for the application of Formal Safety Assessment.

In 2001, IMO passed

the formal guidelines, providing a systematic method for decision-making.

The latest

Guidelines for FSA was enacted in 2013 (IMO, 2013).
Member states and classification societies from IACS submitted many standard reports
about applications of FSA to IMO in recent years, providing guidance for IMO’s
making rules, proving the effectiveness of FSA in marine industry. There were so
many successful applications of FSA that China Classification Society (CCS), the only
recognized organization of the administration in China, started to pay more attention
to the usage of FSA in making and modifying rules of ocean-going ships as well as
domestic ships including inland self-unload carriers.

In 2015, CCS published

Guidelines of Applications of FSA to Ships, which was an interpretation to the latest
Guidelines for FSA enacted by IMO, facilitating the understanding of FSA (CCS,
2015).
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2.2

Framework of FSA

Figure 2.1 shows the framework of FSA. For a complete application of formal safety
assessment, there are five steps: Step 1 - Identifying as many hazards with related
accident scenarios as possible and ranking them according to frequency and severity;
Step 2 - Analyzing factors and event sequences of casualties as well as assessing the
level of risk; Step 3 - Proposing RCOs to reduce risks; Step 4 - Calculating cost,
benefit, GCAF, NCAF and other values of RCOs; Step 5 – Giving recommendations
for decision-making.
hazard identification

top-ranked scenarios

risk analysis

intolerable
RCO

negligible
risk assessment

ALARP
RCO

CEA

recommendations

Figure 2.1 – Methodology of FSA
Sources: Author.
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END

2.3

Techniques Used in FSA

For hazard identification and risk analysis, IMO recommends 9 techniques in the latest
guidelines in 2013: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), What
If Analysis Technique (WIAT), Risk Contribution Tree (RCT), Influence Diagram and
Bayesian Network (IMO, 2013). Besides, there are various models widely used in
hazard identification and risk analysis as long as they are effective. Statistical method
is also a good tool for hazard identification and analysis.
Risk matrix model is critical in determining the priorities of hazards in Step 1.
Finding the most risky hazards is important since it is unnecessary to analyze all
hazards. All identified hazards are ranked based on their frequency and severity, and
then researchers choose several main hazards with high risk to analyze in detail.
It is obvious that there is no absolute safety. All industries cannot mitigate all risks.
So IMO recommended acceptable criteria on both individual risk and social risk in the
latest guidelines. Social risk typically expressed as FN-diagrams or Potential Loss of
Life (PLL), is more important than individual risk. Intolerable risk shall be reduced
regardless of cost while negligible risk can be ignored. Most risk are located in the
ALARP area where a RCO shall not be implemented unless the RCO is cost-effective.
Also, Delphi method, Heinrich method, NSC-Simonds method, Symonds method,
Ratio coefficient method are widely used.

This research paper chooses Delphi

method for determining the risk reduction and ratio coefficient method in calculating
indirect property loss.
There are many recommended options, but it is unnecessary to use all of them in one
report. Table 2.1 shows the applicability of methods for hazard identification, risk
assessment and risk analysis (CCS, 2015).

CCS just listed techniques used in Step 1

and Step 2. Actually some techniques in the table can also be applied in Step 4.
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Table 2.1 - Applicability of techniques
Techniques

Risk Analysis

Hazard

Risk

Identification

Consequence

Possibility

Risk Ranking

Assessment

Brain Storm

A

B

B

B

B

Delphi

A

B

B

B

B

Checklist

A

N

N

N

N

PHA

A

N

N

N

N

FEMA

A

N

N

N

N

HAZOP

A

A

N

N

A

What If

A

A

A

A

A

Risk Matrix

A

A

A

A

B

HRA

A

A

A

A

B

FTA

N

B

B

B

B

ETA

N

A

A

B

N

FN-diagram

B

A

A

B

A

Bayesian

N

N

N

N

A

Note: A – very applicable; B – applicable; N – not applicable.
Sources: China Classification Society, (2015). Guidelines for the Application of Formal Safety
Assessment in Ships. Peking: Author.

2.4

Techniques Chosen in this Research

Table 2.2 presents the techniques chosen in this research.

Organizing a meeting of

experts is inoperable for a student studying in university. Delphi is easier to operate
since the author can consult the experts one by one by email or other electronic means.
Most of experts consulted are investigators and surveyors from Guangdong MSA and
3 experienced navigators on the inland self-unload carriers in the PRD. Besides, their
opinions are essential in identifying hazards and deciding risk reduction of RCOs.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is much easier to operate for a student.
suitable for brief analysis.

PHA is

Though the paper identifies as many hazards as possible,

only several main hazards with high risk are further analyzed.

Nearly all experts in

Guangdong MSA advise me to focus on the top-ranked hazards rather than
comprehensiveness of hazard identification.
identification in this research.
10

So PHA is enough for hazard

Table 2.2 – Techniques used in this paper
Step 1 - Hazards Identification

Step 2 - Risk Analysis

Identification

Ranking

Analysis

Historical data

Historical data

FTA

PHA

Risk Matrix

ETA

Delphi
Sources: Author.

11

Step 4 - CEA

Assessment

Risk Reduction

FN-Diagram

Delphi

3.
3.1

BACKGROUND CONCERNING RESEARCH OBJECT

Waterway in the PRD

The PRD, mainly converged by the West River, the North River and the East River, is
located in the middle south of Guangdong Province.

So many rivers crisscross,

forming a network of waterway with more than 6000 kilometers of inland navigation
mileage, producing one of the three biggest economical circles in China.

Throughput

of ports in the PRD accounts for 80% of the whole throughput in Guangdong Province
in the last decade, making one of the three busiest networks of waterway (Wang, 2013).
As shown in Figure 3.1, the PRD is mainly made up by nine cities: Guangzhou,
Zhaoqing, Foshan, Dongguan, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Zhuhai and Shenzhen.
Shenzhen is excluded from the research since it is a typical seaport with little inland
navigation mileage.

Figure 3.1 – Network of waterway in the PRD
Sources: Retrived from world wide web, editted by the author.
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Besides massive merchant ships, there are more than 10,000 small fishing boats in the
PRD. Figure 3.2 is a typical fishing boat in the Pearl River. Normally, these ships
are around 10 meters and less than 30 GT. Fishmen on the boats are local villagers
with little safety awareness.

Figure 3.2 – A typical fishing boat in the Pearl River
Sources: Author

With the development of economy, considerable bridges have been built in recent years
in the PRD. There is a bridge on the main waterway every 6 kilometers averagely in
the PRD.

Insufficient clearance of some bridges on the main waterway restricts the

development inland navigation, raising the risk of bridges’ being collided by ships with
high maximum height like self-unload carriers.
3.2

Characteristics of Inland Self-unload Carriers in the PRD

Figure 3.3 is a picture of a typical inland self-unload carrier operated in the PRD.
Normally, self-unload carriers have bigger sheer at stem, resulting in greater blind area
than general bulk carriers. Besides, there is a conveyer belt extending out of the bow
for conveying sand or gravels from carriers to the wharf, making the visibility of
navigators even worse. Excessive blind area makes seafarers inconvenient to observe
the small ships which are easy to enter into the blind area. According to Regulations
of Statutory Survey for Chinese Inland Ships, the blind area shown in Figure 3.4,
13

should not be longer than 1.5 times of overall length (Loa), or the carrier shall install a
video monitoring device with the function of night vision on the bow to eliminate the
blind area (CCS, 2015). Most ships choose operational methods like ballast handling
to meet the requirement.

However, shipowners and operators always violate

operational requirements since some operation need a lot of time, leading to excessive
blind area in unloaded voyage. Even in fully loaded voyage, the cargo is higher than
general bulk carrier because of V-shape cargo hold as seen in Figure 3.5. Huge blind
area exists if stowage is unreasonable. If the density of bulk cargo is very small, some
operators may violate the limitation of the cargo height, leading to excessive blind area
as well as poor stability (Author, 2018).
Inland self-unload carrier’s loading sand is operated in the river rather than wharf.
Sand dredges transfer wetted sand with about 20% water to self-unload carriers directly.
Normally an inland self-unload carrier is always overloaded when it just finishes the
loading process, which is allowed tacitly for the high efficiency of the loading method,
as long as the carrier does not sail before pumping out water, resulting in risk of
overloaded navigation when moving away from the dredge to mooring place.
Seafarers’ sailing before water’s being pumped out completely enough results in
overloaded voyage. Sometimes, an inland self-unload carrier may be overloaded
even after the water is totally pumped out because seafarers cannot accurately estimate
how much wetted sand shall be loaded. What’s worse, stability of self-unload carrier
is quite sensitive to the quantity of excess cargo because of the V-shape cargo hold.
Normally, for the sake of reducing bending stress of the hull gird, cargo hold is loaded
from stern to bow. Some operators transfer too much sand to the stern of the cargo
hold, contributing to excessive trim by stern which leads to water’s flooding into hull
from the entrance of engine room on the stern. Besides, some operators on the dredge
may transfer more sand to one side of the cargo hold, leading to excessive heel.
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Figure 3.6 shows the loading process of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.
Normally there are more or less 6 heaps of sand in the cargo hold.

The loading

sequence is from NO.1 to NO.6, resulting in excessive trim by stern to the carrier in
loading NO.1 to NO.4, which is risky for small carriers with limited stability margin.

Figure 3.3 – A Typical inland self-unload carrier in the PRD
Sources: Author

Figure 3.4 – Pictorial view of blind area
Sources: Author

Figure 3.5 – Transverse section of inland self-unload carriers
Sources: China Classification Society, (2016). Standards for Steel Inland Ships. Peking: Author.
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Figure 3.6 – Pictorial view of loading process
Sources: Author

3.3

Recently Introduced RCMs

Both the administration and CCS introduced several risk control measures in recent
years: 1) limitation to the length of stem extension of the conveyer belt; 2) limitation
to the length of blind area; 3) installation of video monitoring device with the function
of night vision if the blind area is beyond the stipulated length (introduced in 2015); 4)
establish standard manual to guide the loading and erect rulers in the cargo hold to
measure the height of cargo; 5) establish requirements on watching in fishing areas
and wharf areas.
Video monitoring device with night vision can totally eliminate the blind area, but it
is voluntary. Shipowners prefer to choose operational methods like ballasting instead
of installing video device to save cost. The operational procedures are not as practical
as the installation of video monitoring device with the function of night vision since
manning on inland self-unload carrier is limited and it is not easy to cope with so many
small ships. From the perspective of the administration, it is not easy to supervise
seafarers’ implementation.
The standard loading manual relies on the implementation of seafarers.

Worse still,

potential excessive trim may be caused by the standard loading process.
All in all, the recently introduced measures are relatively reasonable but too reliable
on good safety awareness of seafarers.

Measures which facilitate seafarers’ fulfilling

duties shall be paid more attention.
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3.4

Acceptance Criteria of GCAF and NCAF

Acceptable criteria varies in different countries.
($) as threshold value of GCAF and NCAF.

Once IMO recommended 3 million

The value has become outdated and new

criteria is still in discussion (Skjong, 2018). Rolf Skjong recommended the following
formula to calculate optimum acceptable NCAF (Skjong, 2002): NCAFA = ge(1-w)/4w.
In the formula: g is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; e is expected lifetime of
a person assessed at birth; w is the proportion of time we invest in economic activity.
Considering vacation, education and retirement, w is around 1/7 for China. As seen
in Table 3.1, the optimum acceptable NCAFA for China in 2017 is 1,000,000 ($).
Table 3.1 – Calculation of acceptable NCAF
g ($)

w

e (year)

NCAFA

9300

1/7

75

1,000,000

Sources: national bureau of statistics of China.
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4.

DATA ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL ACCIDENTS

Considering that accidents reports from 2016 to 2017 is still not completely available,
resulting in obstacles in collecting investigation reports, considering that voluntary
installation of video device with night vision (RCO 1) was introduced in 2015 (CCS,
2015), leading to difficulty of figuring out the number of carriers which voluntarily
installed video device, this study uses data from 2006 to 2015 for analysis.
4.1

Classification of Accidents

Regulation on Investigation of Inland River Traffic Accidents divides accidents into
six main categories: a) collision, contact or damage by waves; b) touching rocks or
grounding; c) fire or explosion; d) sinking; e) damage of important components which
affect seaworthiness obviously; f) others (China Transport Ministry, 2012).
Inland self-carriers’ touching rocks is not common because riverbed of inland
waterways in the PRD are covered by silt. It is unnecessary to set Category b in this
research. The draft of most inland self-unload carriers is about 4 meters and heavy
groundings also rarely happen. As to category e, there is enough time for seafarers to
take measures to prevent further risk as long as the rudder is still working. The only
reported case about failure of important component is the failure of rudder which
resulted in a collision in the end and the case can be classified into collision. Damage
by waves never happened to inland ships of 300 GT and above in the past in the PRD.
For the convenience of researching, the author classifies accidents into five specific
types: collision, sinking, contact, fire, explosion, others. Collision means collision
between ships.

Contact means ships’ contacting objects which are not ships,

including bridges, rocks, reverbed and other unidentified objects. Fire and explosion
are easy to understand as their names suggest. Sinking means a self-unload carrier’s
sinking without collision, contact, fire and explosion. Accidents do not belong to any
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type above are classified into others.

98 accidents involving 101 inland self-unload

carriers of and above 300 GT happened from 2006 to 2015.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of accidents in each year. There is neither obvious
increasing nor decreasing tendency in these ten years. More accidents happened
when estate industry was booming like 2007, 2011 and 2015, for the sake of more
voyages of inland self-unload carriers in a prosperous market of estate industry.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of accidents in each type. From the perspective of
number of accidents, collision is the main accident type. Sinking which is mainly
self-sinking for the sake of classing sinking accident caused by collision, contact, fire
or explosion into the primordial accident, is the second most, followed by contact.

Figure 4.1 – Distribution of accidents in each year
Sources: Author.
3% 5%
8%
collision
sinking

13%

contact
fire and explosion

71%

others

Figure 4.2 – Distribution of accidents in each type
Sources: Author.
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4.2

Definition of Human Errors

Normally investigators define a major cause and several minor causes in a report.
Most of these causes are human errors. It is difficult to classify human errors since
they are interrelated. In this paper, omission means the navigator does not observe or
observe potential risks too late to avoid the accident because of fatigue, distraction and
excessive blind area. Carelessness means the navigator has observed the potential
hazard early enough but pays limited attention, like haste misjudgment, omission of
signal and dangerous operations (deviating customary route, dangerous overtaking,
overspeed, keeping small distance, ignoring VHF, etc.).

Poor skill means the

navigator pays enough attention but still fails to operate correctly due to unfamiliarity
with ship maneuverability and navigable environment. For instance, a navigator
berths carefully but still collides other ships or shoreside structures.
4.3

Data Analysis Concerning Collision

Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of all 69 collisions in six time zone. There are more
collisions which happened from midnight to 8:00 in the next morning. Fatigue and
bad visibility at this period may be two factors.

Figure 4.3 – Distribution of collisions in time zones
Sources: Author.
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Table 4.1 shows the major causes of the 69 collisions. Almost every accident involves
human error. However, for some collisions like self-unload carriers’ colliding small
boats due to omission of watch, owing all responsibilities to seafarers is unfair.
According to the communication with seafarers on self-unload carries, operational
procedures are not as practical as the installation of video monitoring device to
eliminate blind area since manning on inland self-unload carrier is limited and it is not
easy to cope with so many widely distributed small boats. China MSA has organized
training courses about watching in fishing areas and wharf areas, the effectiveness is
not good. From the perspective of the administration, it is not easy to monitor
seafarers’ obeying operational procedures (Author, 2018).
Recognizing that most of collisions can be avoided if one side takes measures
reasonably, so the faults of self-unload carriers in accidents mainly caused by the other
ships are also helpful in hazard identification and analysis. Considering that three
collisions happened between inland self-unload carriers, actually there are 13 inland
self-unload carriers encountered collisions mainly caused by the other ship. In these
13 cases, only one carrier was totally without fault. The most common cause is
carelessness.
Table 4.1 – Major causes of collisions
The other ship’s fault

10

Ommision (did not observe or observed the other ship too late to avoid collision)

30

Carelessness (observed the other ship early but paid no attention or dangerous operations)

22

Poor skill (observed the other ship and paid enough attention but failed)

2

Climate (Heavy fog)

2

Uncertifacted navigator

2

Failure of rudder

1

Sources: Author.

Table 4.2 illustrates that 70% of collisions are self-unload carriers’ colliding other ships.
58% of ships collided by self-unload carriers are small boats (less than 30 GT), as seen
in Table 4.3. Table 4.4 provides a horizontal comparison on the number of collisions
with small boats by ship type operated in the PRD. Inland self-unload carriers
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account for 80% collisions with small boats while its proportion in ships in the PRD
is far less than 80%, demonstrating self-unload carriers’ higher frequency of colliding
small boats. Larger blind area may be one of the causes.

Table 4.5 shows the GT of

the 28 inland self-unload carriers which collided small boats. 22 of them are carriers
of 1000 GT and above. Considering that the number of inland self-unload carriers
less than 1000 GT are almost the same with the number of carriers of and above 1000
GT, inland self-unload carriers of 1000 GT and above have higher frequency in
colliding small boats. Normally, the larger the inland self-unload carrier is, the wider
its blind area is, partly proving the influence of blind area. Table 4.6 shows the
conditions of loading for self-unload carriers which collided small ships. Most of
self-unload carriers which collided small boats are unloaded. Normally, unloaded
inland self-unload carriers own larger blind area, further proving the positive
correlation between blind area and self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats.
Table 4.2 – Forms of collisions
Colliding

Being collided

Head-on

Total

48

16

5

69

Sources: Author.
Table 4.3 – GT of ships collided by inland self-unload carriers
less than 30

30 - 150

150 and above

total

28

2

18

48

Sources: Author.
Table 4.4 – Types of ships which collided small boats
self-unload carrier

oil tanker

high-speed ship

general carrier

container

28

1

1

1

1

Sources: Author.
Table 4.5 – GT of inland self-unload carriers which collided small boats
300 to 1000 GT

Of 1000 GT and above

total

6

22

28

Sources: Author.
Table 4.6 – Loading conditions of inland self-unload carriers
Without load

Full load

Total

23

5

28

Sources: Author.
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Table 4.7 shows the materials of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers.
Over 90% of them are wooden boats which are more difficult to be detected by radar
than steel ships (Lv, 2016).
Table 4.7 – Materials of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers
wooden

steel

Total

25

3

28

Sources: Author.

As seen in Table 4.8, most of small boats collided by self-unload carriers are fishing
boats.

About one fourth of the 24 fishing boats are uncertificated, which means they

are made by local villagers without certification, resulting in difficulty of raising safety
level by improving regulations of small boats.

The solution to uncertificated small

boats is strengthened supervision rather than improved regulations of them.
Table 4.8 – Usage of small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers
Fishing boat

Traffic boat

Cargo boat

Ferry

24

1

2

1

Sources: Author.

As seen in Table 4.9, there are less collisions with small ships from April to June
because fishing in the Pearl River is forbidden in this period (Kong, 2017), confirming
the important role of fishing boats in these small boats.
Table 4.9 – Small boats collided by inland self-unload carriers in each month
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Jun.

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

3

3

3

0

1

0

2

2

7

3

0

4

Sources: Author.

As seen in Table 4.10, mostly, visibility was good when collisions between inland selfunload carriers and small boats happened since navigation in heavy fog is forbidden.
Fog did not play an essential role in self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats while
device with additional function of passing through heavy fog is far more expensive
than the common type. So the function of passing through heavy fog is unnecessary.
Table 4.10 – Visibility when inland self-unload carriers collided small boats
Good

Light fog

Heavy fog

total

24

3

1

28

Sources: Author.
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4.4

Data analysis concerning sinking

There are 13 sinking casualties from 2006 to 2015.

All 13 sinking accidents are

capsizing because bulk slip and free liquid surface make the unseaworthy carrier easy
to capsize in the final stage of accidents.
As seen in Table 4.11, none of sunken inland self-unload carriers is unloaded since
unloaded self-unload carriers have enough freeboard to ensure stability margin.
Sunken self-unload carriers are either loaded or in the process of loading and unloading.
As seen in Table 4.12, most of sunken inland self-unload carriers are less than 1000
GT because smaller carriers have less stability margin.

Their stability is easy to

become unqualified for overload.
Table 4.11 – Loading conditions of sunken inland self-unload carriers
Loaded

Loading

Unloading

Unloaded

5

6

2

0

Sources: Author.
Table 4.12 – GT of sunken inland self-unload carriers
Less than 1000 GT

Of and above 1000 GT

9

3

Sources: Author.

Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of sinking in six time zones.
happened from 20:00 to 8:00 in the next morning.
omission and carelessness.

More accidents

Seafarers’ fatigue results in

Poor vision in night is obstacle to communication

between seafarers on carriers and operators on dredgers as well as detection of dangers.

Figure 4.4 – Distribution of sinking accidents in time zones
Sources: Author.
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Figure 4.5 shows the major causes of the 13 sinking accidents. Obviously, improper
loading is the main cause.

Mainly, there are three kinds of improper loading:

unbalanced transverse loading, unbalanced longitudinal loading and over-high loading.
Unbalanced transverse loading contributes to heel, reducing freeboard and inlet angel.
Unbalanced longitudinal loading results in unacceptable trim, reducing inlet angel.
Over-high loading raises the gravity center of cargo, leading to poor stability as well
as excessive blind area.

Overload is the second major cause. Seafarers always let

the inland self-unload carriers overload first, and then pump out water. Seafarers may
sail before water is pumped out completely enough or fail in estimation of the amount
of wetted sand should be loaded. They do not want to trouble themselves to unload
excessive sand. Also, shipowners may encourage seafarers to ignore small amount of
overload which means additional money for them.

Figure 4.5 – Major causes of sinking accidents
Sources: Author.

4.5

Data analysis concerning contact

Table 4.13 shows the objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers in the PRD. Six
of objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers are bridges because of the high
density of bridges in the PRD.
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As seen in Table 4.14, carelessness is the most common major cause of contact.
However, the severest contact which led to collapse of the bridge contacted, is caused
by heavy fog.
As seen in Table 4.15, all of the eight inland self-unload carriers which contacted
bridge or other objects are of and above 1000GT since bigger carriers have both higher
height and deeper draft.
As seen in Table 4.16, inland self-unload carriers account for 37.5% of ships contacting
bridges in the PRD. The frequency of colliding bridges is higher than other ships but
not so obvious as colliding small boats.
Table 4.13 – Objects contacted by inland self-unload carriers
Bridge

Rock

Wharf

6

1

1

Carelessness

Poor navigation skill

Climate (Heavy fog)

5

2

1

Sources: Author
Table 4.14 – Major causes of contacts

Sources: Author
Table 4.15 – GT of inland self-unload carriers in contacts
Less than 1000 GT

Of and above 1000 GT

0

8

Sources: Author
Table 4.16 – Ships which contacted bridges in the PRD by ship type

4.6

Inland self-unload carrier

General cargo ship

Working ship

6

7

3

Data analysis concerning fire and explosion

Fire and explosion is not common for inland self-unload carriers. Two fire casualties
were caused by welding.

One explosion was caused by short circuit and fuel of flash

point less than 60 Celsius degree which has been forbidden to use on inland self-unload
carriers.

For lack of historical data, statistical analysis for fire and explosion is

meaningless.
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Summary of data from 2006 to 2015

4.7

As seen in Table 4.17 and 4.18, more than half of fatalities are third parties. Most of
them are fishmen collided by inland self-unload carriers.

Table 4.19 shows the

frequency and PLL of two scenarios which shall be further discussed in Chapter 5.
Table 4.17 – Number of accidents and fatalities
Initial
event

Number of accidents
total

With fatality

Number of fatalities
Without

To crew

To 3rd party

fatality

Crew

Third party

Collision

69

5

33

31

18

50

Sinking

13

6

0

7

18

0

Contact

8

0

1

7

0

8

Fire

2

1

0

1

1

0

Explosion

1

1

0

0

3

0

others

5

4

0

1

4

0

Total

98

17

34

47

44

58

Sources: Author.
Table 4.18 – Frequency of accidents (Fleet = 12899 ship*years)
Frequency
Initial event

total

With fatality

Without fatality

To crew

To 3rd party
2.56E-03

Collision

5.35E-03

3.88E-04

Sinking

1.01E-03

4.65E-04

Contact

6.20E-04

Fire

1.55E-04

7.75E-05

Explosion

7.75E-05

7.75E-05

others

3.88E-04

3.10E-04

Total

7.60E-03

1.32E-03

2.40E-03
5.43E-04

7.75E-05

5.43E-04
7.75E-05
7.75E-05

2.64E-03

3.64E-03

Sources: Author.
Table 4.19 – Two scenarios of inland self-unload carriers of and above 1000 GT
Scenarios

Number of

Fatalities

Frequency

PLL

accidents
Collide small boats due to omission

16

19

2.46E-3

2.92E-3

Collide small boats due to carelessness

5

6

7.68E-4

9.21E-4

Note: Fleet = 6512 ship*years; all fatalities in the table are to third party like fishmen.
Sources: Author.
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5.
5.1

THE APPLICATION OF FSA TO RESEARCH OBJECT

STEP 1 – Hazard Identification

5.1.1 List of Identified Hazards
The HAZID was first conducted by the author who is a nominated surveyor, and then
supplemented and perfected by experts familiar with research object (i.e. shipowners,
navigators, ship designers, surveyors and investigators from the PRD).

As seen in

Table 5.1 to 5.3, 30 hazards were identified by checking operations in three working
conditions: sailing; loading and unloading; berthing and mooring.
Table 5.1 – Potential hazards under condition of sailing
NO.

Hazard

1

Colliding small boats due to omission

2

Collision with ships more than 30 GT due to omission

3

Collision or contact due to intentional carelessness (like dangerous operations)

4

Collision or contact due to unintentional carelessness (like haste misjudgment)

5

Sinking due to over-high load

6

Sinking due to overload

7

Sinking due to rapid rotation with initial heel caused by improper load

8

Collision or contact due to poor skill

9

Collision or contact due to uncertificated navigator

10

Collision or contact due to failure of important components such as rudder

11

Sinking due to free liquid surface in the cargo hold

12

Collision or contact due to climate (heavy fog)

13

Sinking due to climate (rapids)

14

Sinking due to hull failure

Sources: Author.
Table 5.2 – Potential hazards under condition of loading and unloading
NO.

Hazard

1

Capsizing caused by excessive heel due to unreasonable distribution of cargo

2

Capsizing caused by excessive trim due to unreasonable distribution of cargo

3

Capsizing caused by poor stability due to intentional overload

4

Capsizing caused by free liquid surface due to failure of pump

5

Capsizing caused by free liquid surface due to failure of alarm system and forgetting start-up

6

Capsizing caused by free liquid surface due to failure of high-level-water alarm system

Sources: Author.
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Table 5.3 – Potential hazards under condition of berthing and mooring
NO.

Hazard

1

Contact or collision when berthing due to poor skill

2

Contact or collision when berthing due to omission

3

Personal injury due to wrong operation of machine

4

Personal injury due to failure of structure (like conveyor arm, cable and anchor chain)

5

Drowning as consequence of sinking in water due to omission of seafarers

6

Fire or explosion caused by short circuit and accumulated gas

7

Fire or explosion caused by welding and accumulated gas in repairing

8

Being collided due to turning off anchor light in mooring

9

Being collided due to mooring in customary route

10

Being collided in traffic boat (normally every carrier in the PRD equips a small traffic boat)

Sources: author.

5.1.2 Top-ranked Hazards
Table 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 define the frequency index, severity index and risk matrix. The
frequency index of a hazard is decided by the magnitude of its frequency.

Severity

index is decided by effects on human and property loss.
Table 5.4 – Definition of Frequency Index
FI

Severity

Definition

F

7

Frequent

Likely to occur once per month on one ship

10

Likely to occur once per year on one ship

1

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships

10-1

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 100 ships

10-2

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships

10-3

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10,000 ships

10-4

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 100,000 ships

10-5

6
5

Probable

4
3

Remote

2
1

Extremely remote

Sources: IMO, (2013). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO
Rule-Making Process. London: Author.
Table 5.5 – Definition of Severity Index
SI

Severity

Effects on human

Property loss ($)

S

1

Minor

Minor injuries or very small property loss

< E5

0.01

2

Significant

Single severe injurie or small property loss

E5 – E6

0.1

3

Severe

Single fatality or multiple severe injuries or

E6 – 2.0E6

1

> 2.0E6

10

medium property loss.
4

Catastrophic

Multiple fatalities or huge property loss

Sources: author.
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Table 5.6 – Definition of Risk matrix
Risk Index (RI)
SEVERITY
FI

Frequency

7

1

2

3

4

Minor

significant

severe

catastrophic

8

9

10

11

7

8

9

10

6

7

8

9

5

6

7

8

4

5

6

7

3

4

5

6

2

3

4

5

Frequent

6
5

Reasonably probable

4
3

remote

2
1

Extremely remote

Sources: IMO, (2013). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO
Rule-Making Process. London: Author.

Table 5.7 shows the two top-ranked hazards with respect to human life. Big inland
self-unload carriers’ colliding small boats results in third-party fatalities while small
carriers’ sinking leads to fatalities of crew.
Table 5.8 shows the two top-ranked hazards with respect to property loss.

Big inland

self-unload carriers’ contacting bridges normally results in considerable property loss
for high cost of repairing bridges.
Table 5.7 – Top-ranked hazards with respect to human life
Main Hazards

FI

SI

RI

Fatalities as consequence of colliding small boats by big carriers (of and above 1000

3

3

6

3

3

6

FI

SI

RI

Medium property loss as consequence of collision due to omission or carelessness

3

3

6

Medium property loss caused by contact of carriers of and above 1000 GT

3

3

6

GT) with blind area due to omission
Fatalities as consequence of sinking due to overload or improper loading of small
carriers (less than 1000 GT).
Sources: author
Table 5.8 – Top-ranked hazards with respect to property loss
Main Hazards

Sources: author
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5.2

STEP 2 – Risk Analysis

5.2.1 ETA and FTA on Accidents
Figure 5.1 shows the ETA on collision. The event sequence of colliding small boats,
colliding bigger ships and being collided are different.

Normally, colliding small

boats brings about limited damage to inland self-unload carriers but catastrophic
damage small boats.

In contrast, collisions with large ships, especially with huge sea-

going vessels, result in high risk of fatalities on inland self-unload carriers.

After

collision, seafarers have more chance to survive if inland self-unload carriers sink
slowly.
Figure 5.2 shows the FTA on collision.
proportion of major causes.

Human factors account for considerable

The most common major cause varies from scenarios.

Omission is more common in colliding small boats while carelessness is more common
in collision with ships more than 30 GT.
Figure 5.3 shows the FTA on sinking accidents.
resulted from poor stability.

About 80% of sinking accidents

Improper load and overload are causes of poor stability.

Overload and improper load are easy to observe but seafarers just ignore the hazards
for various factors such as poor safety awareness.

The key to controlling overload

and improper load is effective supervision.
The event sequence of sinking is quite simple.

Most of inland self-unload carriers

capsized suddenly and rapidly without time for escaping.

So ETA on sinking

accident is omitted here.
Figure 5.4 shows the ETA on contact.

The most severe scenario is that a self-unload

carrier contacts a bridge with people on it and makes the bridge collapse.

For

contacts with underwater objects, inland self-unload carriers capsize rapidly when
excessive heel or trim appears, or seafarers normally have enough time to deal with
damage or evacuate.
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successful rescue
aware
unsuccessful rescue

boat(<30GT)
unaware
collide
not sinking
ship(>30GT)

capsize rapidly

collision

sinking
sink slowly

not sink
collided
sink rapidly
sink
sink slowly

Figure 5.1 – ETA on collision
Sources: author.
collision
rapids

failure of equipment

human factor

climate

fog
wind

omission

uncertificated navigator

carelessness

poor skill

fatigue
without alarm
blind area

poor safety awareness

Figure 5.2 – FTA on collision
Sources: author.
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fatigue

poor training

sinking
rapids

personnel

poor stability

climate
wind

overload

over-high cargo

heel

free liquid surface

excessive trim
loading speed

improper load

improper load

hull failure

Do not flat over-high sands

failure of pump

failure of alarm

forget starting

Figure 5.3 – FTA on sinking accident
Sources: author.
bridge does not collapse

bridge
people on bridge
Bridge Collapse
no person on bridge
contact

not sink
underwater
object

capsize rapidly
sink
sink slowly

Figure 5.4 – ETA on contact
Sources: author.
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5.2.2 Risk Assessment
5.2.2.1 Individual risk assessment
Intuitively, individual risk of third parties or passengers is not in the scope of this study.
Only the individual risk of crew on inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is researched.
Assuming a crew size of 8 on a typical inland self-unload carrier according to the
average gross tonnage of the fleet and manning principals, the individual risk of crew
is estimated to be 4.3E-04 per ship year.

Table 5.9 shows the individual risk criteria

recommended by the IMO (IMO, 2000).

Besides, Li recommended 1.4E-4 as the

datum value of individual risk of staff in transportation industry in China (Li, 2010).
If we adjust one order of magnitude to make the ALARP area, it is 1.4E-5 to 1.4E-3.
According to the individual risk acceptance criteria, the individual risk of crew on
inland self-unload carriers falls within the ALARP area.
Table 5.9 – Individual risk criteria
Lower limit of ALARP

Upper limit of ALARP

Crew

10-6

10-3

Passenger

10-6

10-4

Third parties, public ashore

10-6

10-4

For new ship

10-6

Reduce an order of magnitude

Sources: IMO. (2000). Decision parameters including risk acceptance criteria: submitted by Norway
(MSC 72/16/X). London: Author.

5.2.2.2 Social risk assessment
The societal risk to crew is expressed through FN-diagram presented in Figure 5.5
established by the method recommended by the IMO.

Societal risk of crew on inland

self-unload carriers in the PRD falls within the ALARP area.

IMO gave several FN-

diagrams for ocean-going ships including bulk carriers based on data from LMIS from
1978 to 1998. Compared with the FN-diagram of ocean-going bulk carriers in Figure
5.6, inland self-unload carriers’ frequency of multiple fatalities is lower because of
fewer seafarers and higher survival rate than ocean-going carriers.
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Frequency of N or more fatalities

10-3

Total risk
Collision
Sinking

10-4

Intolerable
ALARP

10-5

Negligible
1

10

1000

100
Fatalities (N)

Figure 5.5 – FN-diagram for risk of research object to crew (2006-2015)
Sources: author

Figure 5.6 – FN-diagram for risk of ocean-going ships to crew (1978-1998)
Sources: IMO. (2000). Decision parameters including risk acceptance criteria: submitted by Norway
(MSC 72/16/X). London: Author.

Though inland self-unload carriers caused considerable fatalities to third parties like
fishmen, it is difficult to establish acceptable criteria because it is not easy to determine
the Economic Value (EV) for involving two parties in one accident.

This study

established a FN-diagram for inland self-unload carriers’ risk to third parties by
halving the third-party fatalities as well as using the same EV of inland self-unload
carriers in the PRD.

As seen in Figure 5.7, the risk is also in the ALARP area.

Table 5.10 supplements the process of calculating PLLA and FN-diagram. For an
inland self-unload carrier in the PRD, an average PLLA is based on the EV of the
activity.

It is not possible for the author to get the accurate EV for self-unload carriers
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in each year from 2006 to 2015. By consulting shipowners, based on the average
gross tonnage of the fleet, the average annual EV (which is equal to the annual turnover)
for each carrier is estimated to be approximately $400,000.
For decreasing trend of occupational fatalities and increasing trend of GNP in the last
decade, PLLA calculated by data of 2017 is more reasonable.
Frequency of N or more fatalities

10-3
Third party

10-4

Intolerable
ALARP

10-5

Negligible
1

10

1000

100
Fatalities (N)

Figure 5.7 – FN-diagram for risk of research object to third parties (2006-2015)
Sources: author
Table 5.10 – Data about calculation of PLLA
Year

Occupational fatalities

GNP ($) trillion

2006

112822

3.4

2007

101480

4.1

2008

91172

4.9

2009

83196

5.3

2010

79552

6.2

2011

75572

7.4

2012

71983

8.1

2013

69434

8.8

2014

68061

9.8

2015

66182

10.5

2016

43062

11.2

2017

37852

12.4

EV of one ship ($)

400,000

PLLA = number of fatalities ⋅ EV / GNP = 1.22E-3 (data of 2017)
F1 = PLLA/(1+1/2+1/3+1/4+1/5+1/6+1/7+1/8) = 4.5E-4
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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5.3

STEP 3 – Identification of Risk Control Options

Table 5.11 – Risk Control Options
RCO 1
RCO 2
RCO 3
RCO 4
RCO 5
RCO 6
RCO 7

Video monitoring device with night vision for carriers of and above1000 GT
TCPA and DCPA alarm of Radar with training for carriers of and above1000 GT
Improved design of loading and unloading procedure
Electrical overload and over-high load supervising system
Improved safety education of seafarers
Set standard for noise of navigation room and rest rooms (< 65 DB)
W-Shape cargo hold

Sources: Author.

Table 5.11 presents 7 alterative RCOs put forward by experts and the author.
RCO 1 can eliminate the excessive blind area to facilitate the watch of seafarers,
reducing possibility of colliding small boats due to omission.

Its effectiveness varies

from visual range of video device.

Normally, speed of inland self-load carrier ranges

from 13 to 17 kilometer per hour.

Most navigators consulted said they need at least

300 meters distance to ensure success rate of avoiding colliding small boats at that
speed.

Risk reduction of video device with visual range of 300 meters shall be

discussed in Step 4.
RCO 2 mainly reduces hazards detected by radar but omitted.

Alarm based on TCPA

and DCPA can remind navigators of the potential hazards at an early stage.

Besides,

considerable navigators said they need training on radar, especially for imported radar
with instruction of foreign languish.

MSA can organize onboard training once a year.

However, the cost benefit assessment is complex because some carriers have already
installed radar with alarm voluntarily, resulting in huge work of calculating the number
of carriers with or without alarm.
RCO 3 aims to reduce capsizing caused by improper loading.
shall establish criteria for stability in the process of loading.

The administration

It can be lower than the

normal criteria with certain limitations of operations like maximum steering angle,
distance between anchorage and dredger, etc.

Nonetheless, overload in the process

of loading without any standard shall be forbidden.
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Its initial cost, namely the design

fee, is cheap.

The main cost is reduced shipment or reduced loading efficiency.

Its

effectiveness depends on the implementation.
RCO 4 is a good concept about preventing intentional overload and over-high load,
but there is no mature product.

Besides, wave and flow distribution are challenges

for the accurate detection of freeboard.

Both the cost and benefit are hard to estimate.

RCO 5 pays attention to the widely existed human errors in accidents.

MSA can

organize brief onboard training once a year by sending brochures about lessons learned
from accidents.

Its cost is limited since the training is conducted onboard.

However,

uncertainty of human errors makes the risk reduction extremely difficult.
RCO 6 aims to create a better rest environment for seafarers to mitigate fatigue.
Strengthened structure and improved hull lines are the main cost while risk reduction
is hard to determine.
RCO 7 lowers the barycenter of cargo to improve stability, but W-shape cargo hold
needs two conveyors belts, further weakening visual range, leading to difficulty in
estimating risk reduction.
5.4

STEP 4 – Cost-effectiveness Analysis

RCO 1 is analyzed in this step because its cost and benefit are relatively easier to assess
than other RCOs.

Cost benefit assessments of other RCOs need further study.

5.4.1 Cost estimation
Initial cost is based on information from suppliers.

Lifetime of inland self-unload

carriers is 33 years according to Regulation on Old Ship Management (China Transport
Ministry, 2002).

Table 5.12 presents the marginal cost of RCO 1 for new ship.

Table 5.12 – Marginal Cost of RCO 1 for new ship (Depreciation rate = 5%)
RCO
RCO 1

Replacement

Marginal Initial

Marginal Operation

Total marginal cost

cycle

cost ($)

cost ($)

($ / ship*year)

5 years

2,000

200/cycle

265

Sources: Author.
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5.4.2 Risk reduction of RCO 1
Risk reduction is based on considerations of scenarios affected.

Experts opinions on

risk reduction of big carriers’ colliding small boats due to omission range from 20% to
70% and concentrate in the range of 40% to 70%, as seen in Table 5.13.
Some experts think RCO 1 can also reduce big carriers’ colliding small boats due to
carelessness.

In some historical accidents, navigators observed small boats early but

missed them after small boats’ entering into blind area.
deem carelessness means poor safety awareness.

In contrast, some experts

An incautious navigator would not

use the device even if he had observed small boats.

The consensus degree is low.

This study ignores the risk reduction from this scenario to get a higher NCAF.
Table 5.13 – Risk reduction of big carriers’ colliding small boats due to omission
< 10%

10%-20%

20%-30%

30%-40%

40%-50%

50%-60%

60%-70%

> 70%

0

0

2

2

6

6

6

0

Sources: Questionnaires from experts (single choice question).
Table 5.14 – Results of CEA of RCO 1 based on different risk reduction
property

Reduction

Risk

PLL

loss

Proportion

Reduction

Cost

Benefit

NCAF

(1)

(2)

(3)

∆R= (1)*(3)

∆C

∆B=(2)*(3)

(∆C-∆B)/∆R

2.92E-03

114

20%

5.84E-04

265

22.8

414,726

2.92E-03

114

30%

8.76E-04

265

34.2

263,470

2.92E-03

114

40%

1.17E-03

265

45.6

187,842

2.92E-03

114

50%

1.46E-03

265

57.0

142,466

2.92E-03

114

60%

1.75E-03

265

68.4

112,215

2.92E-03

114

70%

2.04E-03

265

79.8

90,607

Sources: Author

5.5

STEP 5 – Recommendations

An RCO is regarded to be cost-effective if the NCAF is less than USD 1 million, which
has been explained in Chapter 3.
5.14.

Obviously, RCO 1 is cost-effective, as seen in Table

The actual NCAF of RCO 1 should be even lower.

This study recommends

the implementation of RCO 1 and further research of the other six RCOs.
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6.

SUMMARY, PROSPECT AND LIMITATION

The application of FSA methodology to inland self-unload carriers in the PRD is
conducted according to the data from 2006 to 2015, filling the gap of overall risk
assessment of inland self-unload carriers in the PRD.

The overall risk of research

object is located in the ALARP area, which means a RCO shall be implemented to
reduce the risk when it is cost-effective.
Colliding small boats is a top-ranked hazard for inland self-unload carriers of and
above 1000 GT.

RCO 1 is a cost-effective solution to this hazard.

This study

advises the administration to make the installation of video monitoring device with
night vision from voluntary to mandatory.
Capsizing due to improper load or overload is a top-ranked hazard for inland selfunload carriers less than 1000 GT. RCO 3 and RCO 4 are likely to be solutions.
The cost is so high if RCO 4 just applies to self-unload carriers in the PRD that it need
more inland self-unload carriers to split the soft developing fee.

Further research on

the application of FSA to inland self-unload carriers in the whole country is
recommended.
Historical accidents show that almost every casualty is caused by human errors more
or less.

RCO 5 and RCO 6 are designed to reduce human errors.

With the tendency of large-size ship, RCO 7 may be a solution to over-high load for
inland self-unload carriers wide enough.
This study is not a standard report for omission of most RCOs’ CEA.

IACS and

ICFTU indicated that considerable applications of FSA need 1 year and some
applications even need 2 or 3 years (Papanikolaou, 2009, P. 126).
finish an application of FSA to a ship type in 3 months.
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It is impossible to

The absence of maritime database in China results in obstacle of applying FSA in the
whole country.

Fortunately, the national maritime database is in construction.

Further research on applications of FSA shall be more convenient in the future.
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